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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY. By James
Willard Hurst. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School,
1960. Pp. 330. $4.64.
James Willard Hurst delivered the ninth series of the Thomas M.
Cooley lectures at the University of Michigan Law School in Novem-
ber, 1959. These lectures have been published as five essays entitled
"Law and Social Process in United States History."
In earlier works,' Professor Hurst has described and discussed the
institutional growth of American law and the relation between that
growth and our economic, political, social and technological develop-
ment. In these essays, Professor Hurst uses his considerable knowl-
edge of American legal history and his impressive power of synthesis
to develop and expand these themes. With these themes he has inter-
woven ideas of the nature of man and of the purpose of human
existence. The result is stimulating and rewarding reading. These
essays contribute significantly not only to the study of American legal
history but also to American jurisprudence.
The first essay concerns the proper scope of the study of American
legal history and stresses the need for a definition and philosophy of
American legal history. The second examines the historical relation
between stability and change in our legal structure, the influence of
non-legal factors in its development, and the extent to which its
development has resulted from short-range decisions taken in igno-
rance of and with lack of concern for non-immediate results. The
third and fourth describe and analyze uses of law to increase aware-
ness and purposeful initiative. The fifth essay discusses the implica-
tions of the law's "legitimate monopoly of violence ' 2 and its relation
to the allocation of power in our society.
This review does not attempt to synopsize these essays. The
abundance of concepts and insights found in the essays precludes sub-
stantial compaction. This review attempts only to sample some of the
material in the essays. It tries to indicate briefly the breadth of
Professor Hurst's approach to American legal history; it also ex-
amines his concepts of "drift" and "direction." 3
1. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (1951); Hurst,
Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States
(1956).
2. Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History 267 (1960).
3. I have tried not to distort these concepts; nevertheless some distortion
may have occurred.
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Legal history should increase our understanding of the realized
and potential uses and limitations of law. Professor Hurst recognizes
that realization of this function requires reference to non-legal data.
Law is an integral part of culture; the understanding of legal history
is impossible without reference to total cultural growth-its economic,
political and social organization and development, and the course of
ideas and emotions. "Full-dimensioned legal history must tell of the
shaping force exercised upon the law from outside it, by what people
wanted, by the functional needs of other institutions, and by the
mindless weight of circumstances."' It must also tell of the means by
which law influenced non-legal developments, and of the extent of that
influence.
In addition, legal history can and should be a valuable part of
human history-at least in an American context. Only the develop-
ment of men's knowledge, ideas, attitudes and emotions qualitatively
distinguishes human history from the evolutionary record of other
species. Our legal history offers a rich source of data relating to this
development, because men viewed law as an instrument by which
non-legal aims might be achieved and because the structure of our
law tended to force men to rationalize and to verbalize those aims.
The second essay introduces the concepts of "drift" and "direction."
Professor Hurst characterizes "direction" as "the impact of inquiry,
debate, and decision proceeding out of awareness and calculated
effort to define ends and means" ;5 it is decision-making based upon at
least some knowledge of the factors which will influence the results of
decision, and with at least some concern for and conscious definition
of non-immediate results. He described "drift" less explicitly. By
"drift" he seems to mean decision-making based primarily upon
widely-held, persistent attitudes and values, made with little or no
concern for non-immediate results.
The difference between "drift" and "direction" is one of degree
rather than of kind. How many influencing factors are known? How
far-reaching is the prediction and valuation of results? Drift merges
gradually into direction; short of the fortunately unobtainable point
where all influencing factors and the totality of results are known,
direction remains drift.
Differences of degree are nevertheless differences. Professor Hurst
believes than in law direction is preferable to drift. Direction, he says,
"is the type of response to life which most truly belongs in the law
and to which the law belongs." 6 The "direction" preferred by Pro-
fessor Hurst is not synonymous with socialistic planning or any other
4. Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History 10 (1960).
5. Id. at 42.
6. Ibid.
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form of statism. "Direction" refers only to the method of decision-
making; it implies almost nothing about the values used in decision-
making. Professor Hurst's preference for direction must be qualified
by reference to the other values he adopts.
He believes that one purpose of human existence is the realization
of man's distinctively human capabilities of awareness and choice.
He measures his values by their tendency to promote this realization.
He also believes that opportunities for this realization should be
available to all. One secondary value which he derives from these
primary values is that the range of practical choices available to men
should be expanded.
Some emphasis must be placed upon the practicality of the available
choices. In any society there exists a consensus of accepted customs,
opinions and beliefs. This consensus is necessary for social existence
and prosperity.7 It also precludes some choices; actions not in accord
with the consensus may be physically possible, but generally they are
not practical alternatives.
One way in which law affects the range of available practical
choices is through its relation to our consensus. In our society the
consensus contains most values which are legally recognized. Our
law responds to and reflects changes in the consensus. We use the
formal sanctions of the law to enforce adherence to at least some
consensual patterns of behavior; this use of law tends to decrease
deviations from the consensual norms. Our respect for law generates
respect for values which receive legal recognition; in this way also the
law reinforces the consensus.
The consensual-legal preclusion of choice in some instances may
effect a net over-all increase in available practical choices. The
standardization of weights and measures, for example, facilitates
commercial transactions and thereby increases material prosperity;
prosperity results in an expansion of the range of practical
choice. Such net increases are perhaps most likely to occur in in-
stances in which the sole purpose of consensual-legal preclusion is
uniformity. In other instances, however, the consensual-legal preclu-
sion effects a net decrease in available practical choices. There is no
significant indirect expansion of choice resulting from the prohibitions
on public nudity. Net decreases occur if the primary purpose of
regulation is to secure universal adherence to majority-morality.
"Direction" guided by Professor Hurst's values would tend to
minimize consensual-legal preclusions which effect net decreases in
the range of available practical choices. Although the example is
perhaps extreme, such "direction" might well remove the legal
7. See de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 8 (Bradley edition 1956).
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restrictions on public nudity. In any event, the result would not be
statism.
Professor Hurst examines policies adopted in our law which in-
creased the range of practical alternatives. Two of the most signifi-
cant of these are: (1) the dispersion of economic and political power;
and (2) promotion of material productivity. The value of dispersed
power is evident; power implies the ability to make practical choices.
The value of material productivity is almost as evident; a man who
must work twenty hours a day to procure his minimal needs of food
and shelter has few available practical choices. Professor Hurst states
that we view material well-being as a means to individual fulfillment.
It is difficult to demonstrate whether we view material comfort as a
means or as an end itself; although we have rejected material comfort
in favor of survival in time of war, we have never been forced to
reject it in favor of individual development.
In the twentieth century at least, the policy of dispersing power
conflicts with the policy of increasing material productivity. Our
productivity is increasingly dependent upon organization; organiza-
tion requires concentration of power. We have permitted concentra-
tions of power in corporations, labor unions, and in government itself;
the decisions allowing these concentrations have been made by drift
or by default (which is one form of drift). The balance between
productivity and dispersion should be struck by "direction." If those
who "direct" share Professor Hurst's values, the practical possibilities
for individual fulfillment and freedom will be increased.
This review has tried to sketch Professor Hurst's expansive view
of American legal history and his broadly humanistic concept of the
proper uses of law. It is a sampling rather than a condensation. It
is hoped that this review gives some indication of the nature and
extent of the contribution which Professor Hurst has made to
American legal history and jurisprudence.
LEWIS R. MILLst
SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE PRACTICE. Edited by
Thomas G. Roady, Jr. and William R. Andersen. Nashville: Vander-
bilt University Press, 1960. Pp. 423. $10.00.
This is a selection of articles, certain of which, as hereinafter
indicated, have appeared in somewhat similar forms in law reviews
and elsewhere upon selected problems involving corporate practice in
its more complicated form. Essentially, it would seem to the writer,
that its appeal will be to lawyers engaged in such practice who have
t Associate, Grand, Peper & Martin, St. Louis, Missouri.
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